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Foreword

Agency Self-Regulation
Elizabeth Magill*
Discretion is at the center of most accounts of bureaucracy. It is
no mystery why this is so. While agencies are hemmed in by statutes,
the President, and courts, they still possess enormous discretion that
they can exercise in ways that matter to the parties who have a stake
in what they do. For many social scientists who study bureaucracy,
that discretion is just a fact about the world that bureaucrats inhabit.
Legal scholars have tended to take a more normative view. A few
have celebrated agency discretion as making space for the exercise of
expert judgment,1 but the dominant modern approach tends to be
skeptical of that discretion. Scholars working within this latter tradition exhort those with supervisory power to tame that discretion as a
matter of law, politics, or constitutional command.2
* Joseph Weintraub-Bank of America Distinguished Professor of Law, Horace W. Goldsmith Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Rachel Barkow,
Glenn Cohen, Beth Garrett, Jake Gersen, Howell Jackson, Stu Jordan, Daryl Levinson, Tom
Merrill, Dan Ortiz, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Matthew Stephenson, Adrian Vermeule, Ben
Zipursky, and participants in workshops at Colorado, Harvard, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia law schools. Emil Barth, Clinton Dockery, Lara Loyd, Christie Tuttle, and Michael Wolin
provided first-rate research assistance.
1 See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23–24, 154–55 (1938).
2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 52–161 (1969); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92–126 (2d ed.
1979). See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99–134 (1993) (arguing that the legislative and
executive branches should not delegate their powers to agencies because broad agency discretion
“weakens democracy,” “endangers liberty,” and “makes the laws less reasonable”).
June 2009 Vol. 77 No. 4
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Strangely absent from these accounts is a ubiquitous phenomenon: administrative agencies routinely “self-regulate.” That is, they
limit their options when no source of authority requires them to do so.
They voluntarily constrain their discretion. They adopt rules, guidelines, and interpretations that substantively limit their options—limiting either the range of outcomes they can reach or the rationales that
can be used to defend their choices. They also limit their procedural
freedom by committing to afford additional procedures, such as hearings, notices, and appeals, that are not required by any source of authority. The idea that an agent can have an interest in voluntarily
limiting his own options is hardly novel.3 Indeed, it is an ancient proposition. Jon Elster put it simply in introducing his important work on
the subject: “sometimes less is more.”4 Individuals, firms, governments, and, yes, of course, bureaucracies—especially bureaucracies—
will sometimes have an interest in voluntarily limiting their options.
And yet, what this Article calls self-regulation is not now a category that exists in the study of administrative agencies. Some scholars
of the administrative state, it is true, have argued that, when statutes
delegate policymaking authority to agencies and those statutes are, in
their crucial details, vague, agencies should be required to limit their
discretion as a matter of constitutional or statutory command or administrative common law.5 But, other than urging agencies to limit
See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITCONSTRAINTS 1–87 (2000).
4 Id. at 1.
5 The two observers most closely associated with that argument are Kenneth Davis and
Henry Friendly. See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 55–57, 219; HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 142–47 (1962). Professor Bressman has advanced a version of this
argument in the modern period. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 533 (2003) (“[A]gencies
must supply the standards that discipline their discretion under delegating statutes, and it does
not matter for legitimacy purposes whether they do so under ‘ordinary’ administrative law or
‘constitutional’ administrative law.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation after Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 460–66 (2002) (arguing that agencies
must articulate standards limiting their discretion); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at
the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1415–31
(2002) (arguing in favor of agencies promulgating standards that limit their discretion).
A version of the Davis/Friendly argument was embraced by Judge Leventhal in a wellknown lower court decision that rejected the claim that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970
constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758–59 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding Nixon Administration price
freeze in the face of claims that the action violated the nondelegation doctrine). More recently,
Judge Williams of the D.C. Circuit relied on this argument in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA.
See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038–40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). The
Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
3
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their discretion, this literature does not actually pay much attention to
self-regulation. What, precisely, is self-regulation? When do agencies
engage in it, and what can they accomplish when they do so? What
are the implications of that behavior for various debates that we engage in about the administrative state?
The aim of this Article is to create the category of self-regulation
and to persuade students of the administrative state that it has been a
mistake to ignore it. To do that, this Article will identify in Part I the
key features of self-regulation, outline in Part II what an agency can
accomplish by self-regulating, and demonstrate in Part III the implications of serious study of these voluntary agency constraints for important debates about the administrative state.
The first step is to understand the key features of self-regulation.
Doing so requires a working definition of self-regulation and a preliminary descriptive account of the types of self-regulation in which agencies engage. Self-regulation is defined here as an agency action to
limit its own discretion when no source of authority (such as a statute)
requires the agency to act. Paradigmatic examples include enforcement guidelines and “extra” procedures—that is, procedures that the
relevant law would not require the agency to provide.
Understanding self-regulation also requires an understanding of
the consequences of self-regulation—whether and, if so, how self-regulatory measures limit an agency’s options. Grasping the consequences of self-regulatory measures is the key to understanding what
an agency can accomplish by self-regulating, and hence why it might
do so. But it is no easy task to capture the consequences of self-regulation precisely. Understanding how binding an act of self-regulation
can be depends on a host of factors, including having a clear picture of
a less-than-clear corner of administrative law: under what circumstances will a court force an agency to follow its own self-regulatory
measures? Administrative law doctrines actually allow agencies to
make a binding commitment to their self-regulation because the law
promises that, under certain conditions, a court will enforce self-regulatory measures against agencies if and when they violate them.
Having identified the essential features of the category of selfregulation, the Article then examines what an agency can accomplish
through self-regulation. Agencies often need to control policy implementation by subordinates; they may wish to limit their own options
457, 472 (2001) (“We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute.”).
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in order to induce reliance by outside parties; they may hope to protect their own autonomous policy choices—either from being changed
by a future administration or from being overridden by a political
principal today. Self-regulation is a way for an agency to achieve all of
these objectives. Self-regulation also allows the agency to produce
certain collective goods, such as information and reputation, that the
agency needs to do its job but may be underproduced unless affirmative steps are taken to assure their production.
The Article then turns to the implications of agency self-regulation. Part III shows why the study of agency self-regulation can
change the way we understand agencies and the need for and utility
and wisdom of various controls on their behavior. Understanding
when, why, and how agencies self-regulate would round out our understanding of the options an agency has at its disposal to achieve its
objectives, inform our assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
the institutions that monitor and control agencies (courts, the President, and Congress), and fruitfully inform the normative debate over
delegation. Because self-regulation as it is defined here is a voluntary
action by the agency, studying it may also be a particularly useful way
to make progress on one of the most vexing questions for those of us
who study bureaucracy: what makes an agency tick? Study of selfregulation may help us evaluate competing accounts of agency incentives. Part III is not intended to exhaustively explore the implications
of self-regulation; it is instead aimed at demonstrating how many important debates about governance would proceed differently if we
fully incorporated self-regulation into our understanding.
This Article kicks off a now-annual issue of The George Washington Law Review devoted to administrative law.6 Thanks to the Law
Review, we have the luxury of stepping back and taking stock of
where we are in our understanding of our field. It is thus a perfect
occasion to point out that we students of the administrative state are
missing something. Self-regulation is a feature of the landscape that
agencies inhabit and it demands our attention. Or so this Article will
argue.

6 See Annual Review of Administrative Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095 (2008); Annual
Review of Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 695 (2007) (inaugural edition; slightly
revised focus from long-standing annual issue devoted to review of the D.C. Circuit).
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I. Understanding Agency Self-Regulation
A. Defining Self-Regulation
If one defines self-regulation as any agency action that limits its
discretion, the universe is vast. Every time an agency makes a choice
it takes one path instead of others at that moment in time and in that
narrow sense limits its options. More than that, a large number of
agency choices limit the agency’s options in the future either because a
decision, as a legal matter, binds the agency in some way or, even
when that is not the case, the decision creates expectations and reliance that translate into meaningful pressure for the agency in the
future.
For both practical and theoretical reasons, this Article does not
define self-regulation as including so vast a universe. This Article defines “self-regulation” more narrowly to include voluntarily initiated
agency actions that constrain agency discretion when no source of authority requires the agency to act. This universe will be fleshed out
shortly, but paradigmatic examples of such self-regulation include enforcement guidelines, rules that dictate how front-line decisionmakers
will do their jobs, and procedural measures (not required by law) that
specify how an agency will proceed as it implements its statutory
mandate.
As defined here, self-regulation must be voluntarily undertaken.
“Voluntary” is a tricky word, of course, but it has a limited import
here. It simply means that the agency limits its discretion even though
no authoritative source requires it to act. “Source of authority” could
be a statute, a court order, an Executive order, or some other form of
presidential command.7 Thus, self-regulation does not include the
many agency actions that limit discretion that are required by some
authoritative source. In other words, this definition is not intended to
7 Statutes, court orders, and Executive orders do not all bind the agency in exactly the
same way. The most obvious difference relates to the mechanisms available to enforce the commands contained in these instruments. Speaking generally, judicial enforcement is available for
enforcement of court orders and statutory commands, while judicial enforcement is generally not
available for commands contained in Executive orders. See Note, Enforcing Executive Orders:
Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 659, 661–62 (1987) (arguing that courts should change their practices and enforce Executive orders more readily); SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES § 6.024 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (Executive orders not enforceable). Despite such differences, both court orders and Executive orders authoritatively bind the
agency. That is the important point for present purposes, and identifying the differences among
these various commands is beyond the scope of this Article.
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include limits on discretion that an agency adopts when it is otherwise
obligated, for instance, to adopt a rule. The practical reason for somehow narrowing the category should be obvious; one cannot fruitfully
study any and all agency actions that limit discretion.
The other reasons for narrowing the category in this way are
more important. Agency self-limitation that occurs even though the
agency does not need to take any action at all is an especially revealing angle from which to observe agency behavior. In such a case,
it will be easier to detect agency motivation because the limits on discretion are generated by the agency and not by the agency’s understanding of the authoritative command. More than that, focusing on
self-regulation that is voluntarily undertaken facilitates cross-agency
comparisons. An examination of a common example of self-regulation, the adoption of enforcement guidelines, illustrates. Authoritative commands almost never require agencies to adopt enforcement
guidelines, and yet some agencies nonetheless adopt them and some
do not. As developed further in Part III of this Article, observing and
studying that variance across agencies is a promising way to make progress in our study of agency behavior. Finally, self-regulation as defined here is the only way that an agency can accomplish some of the
objectives set forth in Part II of the Article.
The justification for the definition aside, it is worth noting that
there are circumstances where self-regulation as defined here is not an
option for the agency because some source of authority limits the
agency’s discretion directly or requires the agency to limit its own discretion. The former case is self-explanatory. It refers to an authoritative command that requires the agency to, for instance, resolve a
policy question in a particular way. Thus, an auto safety statute might
require the agency to adopt an airbag requirement.
The latter case requires some explanation. Some statutes give an
agency a task to do, but the statutory prohibition cannot be enforced
until the agency adopts rules. A statute, for example, might authorize
the agency to enforce clean air standards once the agency specifies
them. Executive orders likewise might limit an agency’s discretion directly (e.g., all agencies must use method x for determining cost-benefit analysis) or require the agency to do so (e.g., all agencies must
develop their own guidelines setting forth how they will conduct costbenefit analysis). It is true that an agency, in responding to these sorts
of dictates, will often have the opportunity to limit its discretion more
or less. These situations are nonetheless distinct from self-regulatory
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measures of interest here because the agency is required to take some
action in response to the command.
In the case of self-regulation, by contrast, the agency is not required by any source of authority to act in the way it has, but it has
decided to do so and, in so doing, it has not expanded its options, but
limited its options (by how much will be discussed below). Self-regulation is an option for agencies in a wide range of circumstances.
Often an agency is given a task to do, and, if it chooses, it may (or may
not) further specify the criteria or processes by which it will implement the task. Consider a common case. A statute declares unlawful
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and authorizes an agency to
prevent such practices.8 One option available to the agency is to bring
a series of one-shot enforcement actions that, like the development of
the common law, will articulate over time just what it is to be an unfair
or deceptive act or practice. It is true that each time the agency picks
one case from the universe of possible cases to bring, it is in some
sense constraining itself by staking out a position that may exclude
alternative readings of the statute at that particular moment in time
and, more than that, may as a type of precedent constrain agency
choices in the future.
But an act of self-regulation would limit the agency’s range of
options even further than this. Instead of pursuing a series of individual enforcement actions, the agency could announce in advance what
it intends to do in the future. That self-regulation could constrain the
agency’s options as a substantive or procedural matter. Substantively,
the agency could specify what it considers to be a deceptive trade
practice. The agency could identify particular practices that it views as
deceptive or, instead of identifying specific practices, it could identify
the criteria by which it will decide what constitutes an unfair trade
practice. The agency might also limit its options procedurally. Although no source of authority requires it, an agency might commit to
conducting public hearings, guarantee the objects of an enforcement
action a hearing, or endow several units of the agency with sign-off or
review authority before important actions are initiated. Self-regulation, then, is a voluntarily adopted limit on an agency’s choices, and
those limits can relate to the substantive meaning of a legal command
or the process by which the agency will conduct its business.
8 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Many other regulatory
statutes or parts of regulatory statutes have this structure. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2006) (adulterated food); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (2006) (unfair labor practices).
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B. Examples of Substantive and Procedural Self-Regulation
With this definition in mind, observers of the administrative state
will agree that such self-regulatory measures pop up everywhere.
Self-regulation with substantive reach is quite common. Consider just
a couple of examples of agencies (voluntarily) translating general statutory standards into more rule-like commands. Many agencies have
enforcement guidelines that specify how they will exercise their enforcement discretion.9 The agencies that have legal authority under
the antitrust laws to approve mergers have enforcement guidelines
that set forth with some specificity how they will exercise those authorities.10 Both the Federal Trade Commission and the Department
of Justice have issued enforcement guidelines,11 and those guidelines
have changed over time as antitrust policy has changed.12 It is worth
9 The literature contains no systematic discussion or analysis of enforcement guidelines
adopted by agencies. Enforcement guidelines, when they are discussed, are mentioned as just
one example of the broader categories of interpretive rules or policy statements. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—
Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1320 (1992); Stephen
M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 696 (2007); Nina A. Mendelson,
Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398
(2007). The few articles that discuss the development of enforcement guidelines in any depth
focus on specific examples of agency enforcement guidelines. See Hillary Greene, Guideline
Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 771, 776 (2006); Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and
Drug Administration: Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
17, 17 (2005). This lack of systematic treatment in the literature is not because agencies have few
enforcement guidelines. The literature assumes that many agencies adopt enforcement guidelines on a wide variety of matters, and there are many disputes that revolve around enforcement
guidelines in the courts. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
452 F.3d 798, 802–03 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (summarizing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration policy indicating when regional recalls by auto manufacturers are permissible); Sec’y of
Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing the Secretary of
Labor’s enforcement guidelines about when to charge owner-operators and independent contractors with violations of mine safety laws); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d
533, 535–36 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining the Secretary of Labor’s enforcement guideline for
independent contractors indicating usual conditions under which operator may be cited for violation); United States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673, 675 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) (Department of Energy policy on targeted auditing); United States v. Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715,
724–25 (7th Cir. 1974) (discussing FDA interim guidelines indicating acceptable levels of DDT
residues in fish).
10 Greene, supra note 9, at 778; Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 7–8 (2007).
11 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sep. 10, 1992); Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984) (see section 4 on Horizontal Effect of
Non-Horizontal Mergers).
12 See Greene, supra note 9, at 781–802; William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The
Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Merg-
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noting that not all similarly situated agencies do that, however. The
Federal Communications Commission, which also enjoys premerger
authority to approve the transfer of broadcast licenses that occurs
when a merger takes place, has not issued similar enforcement
guidelines.13
Agencies that primarily distribute benefits likewise have adopted
substantive self-regulatory measures. A famous example for administrative lawyers is the Social Security Administration’s “grid” regulations, which succeeded in turning the question of whether a party is
disabled into a series of (more) objective questions.14 Another example is the Department of Interior’s guideline that specifies the criteria
by which it will determine whether a group of people constitutes a
federally recognized Indian tribe and, hence, are eligible for the benefits that come with that status.15 The Attorney General has also gotten into the act, adopting and revising over time the United States
Attorneys’ Manual,16 a manual that commits the government to a variety of substantive policies that are not required by law. This is not the
only self-regulatory measure of this sort at the Department of Justice,17 but it is an important one. For instance, the Manual precludes
ers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 209 (2003); William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 399 & n.81 (2003); Thomas B. Leary,
The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 114–21
(2002); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1400–04 (1998).
13 Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative Analysis
of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 48–49
(2000).
14 See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 114–23 (1983). The Supreme Court upheld the “grid” regulations in Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983).
15 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2008); see also Procedures for Establishing That an American Indian
Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 59 Fed. Reg. 9280 (Feb. 25, 1994) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83).
For a discussion of the tribal recognition rules, see Miami Nation of Indians v. U.S. Department
of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 345–47 (7th Cir. 2001).
16 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia_reading_room/usam.
17 Another example is the series of memos issued in recent years about corporate criminal
prosecutions. The “Thompson Memo,” issued in 2003, set forth nationwide standards for enforcement in the corporate crime area. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y
Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm. For a discussion of the Thompson Memo, see
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095 (2006). The Thompson Memo was superseded by the “McNulty Memo” in December 2006. Memorandum from
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
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the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution following a
prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially the same
transactions,18 a position that is not required by current constitutional
doctrine, which would allow separate prosecutions by separate sovereigns.19 These examples are just the tip of an iceberg, but they are
enough to convey the general pattern: agencies regularly adopt measures that limit their substantive options.
There is also no shortage of “procedural” self-regulation. Here, it
is not that agencies turn standards into something closer to rules, but
rather that agencies commit to offer more procedure than would otherwise be required. Various sources of law, most prominently the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)20 and the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment,21 specify minimum procedures that an agency
must follow in a range of circumstances.22 Agencies cannot fall below
the floors outlined by those legal sources, of course, but they can go
above that floor. The APA says nothing, for example, about the process an agency must follow before an agency issues a notice of proposed rulemaking and very little about the process necessary to acting
“informally” in a variety of circumstances. In such circumstances, the
agencies might fill in the gap with procedural self-regulation. Even
where the law has a lot to say about process, an agency might choose
to afford even more procedure.
A well-known example of procedural self-regulation in recent
years was the Food and Drug Administration’s decision to provide
notice and invite comment on its “guidance documents” even though
the APA would not have required it.23 That requirement was imposed
government-wide by President George W. Bush’s January 2007 Executive order,24 which President Barack Obama revoked soon after he
took office.25 Many agencies have rules that set forth procedures for
18 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-2.031 (otherwise known as the
“Petite policy”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2
mcrm.htm#9-2.031; see also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977) (discussing the “Petite policy”).
19 See Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 28 (noting that previous Supreme Court decisions expressly
permit both state and federal prosecutions for the same act).
20 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3.
22 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976).
23 Lars Noah, The FDA’s New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 137–38 (1997).
24 Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
25 President Barack Obama, Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at
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investigations that go beyond what the law requires.26 Many provide
other procedural protections—such as the right to seek review of decisions—that would not be required by the relevant law.27 Some agencies have guaranteed parties a right of consultation before a decision
is made, even though the law would not require it.28
Finally, agencies have processes that structure decisionmaking in
important ways. A recent announcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) about its enforcement processes is an
excellent example. The new Chair of the Commission reversed previous practices that had required the full Commission to approve certain penalties imposed on companies and the decision to open a
formal investigation.29 This “streamlined” process is intended to, and
no doubt will, have an effect on the pattern of the SEC’s enforcement
actions, just as the process it replaced was intended to, and no doubt
did, have an effect on those patterns.
C. Self-Regulation as Constraint?
Though there are many unanswered questions about the conditions under which an agency will self-regulate, there is no question
that agencies do engage in self-regulation. Their reasons for doing so
will be discussed shortly, but it is important to first understand how
much constraint self-regulation can provide. So far this Article has
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Revocation-Of-Certain-Executive-Orders-Concern
ing-Regulatory-Planning-And-Review.
26 See, e.g., Blassingame v. Sec’y of the Navy, 866 F.2d 556, 557 (2d Cir. 1989) (describing a
Marine Corps regulation that imposes a duty to investigate possible erroneous enlistment); Modern Plastics Corp. v. McCulloch, 400 F.2d 14, 18 (6th Cir. 1968) (citing NLRB regulations regarding prehearing investigations).
27 See, e.g., Singh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
INS regulations permit consideration of factors relevant to extreme hardship that statute does
not make relevant); Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating
that a Merit Systems Protection Board regulation authorizes ALJs to file actions for constructive
discharge); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (concluding that an
agency regulation excuses employees from exhausting remedies); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141,
145–46 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that for what would otherwise be highly discretionary decisions,
Army regulations set forth binding procedural requirements, such as making certain matters part
of the official record).
28 Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 717–21 (8th Cir. 1979) (Bureau
of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) personnel decision reversed when agency failed to consult with tribe
before transferring BIA agent from one area office to another in violation of agency commitment to engage in such consultation).
29 See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to Practising Law
Institute’s “SEC Speaks in 2009” Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2009/spch020609mls.htm; Floyd Norris, Unleashing Enforcement, http://norris.blogs.ny
times.com/2009/02/06/unleashing-enforcement (Feb. 6, 2009 15:25 EST).
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assumed that self-regulatory measures provide some constraint on
agency options, but whether and how they do so is complicated.
Consider first the range of relevant options of how constraining
self-regulation might be.30 At one end of the spectrum, self-regulatory
measures could guide actors inside the agency only, but not be enforceable by any actor outside the agency. An agency official might
be subject to some form of internal sanction for failing to follow the
self-regulation, for instance, but an actor outside the agency would not
have any way to force the agency to follow the measure and could not
obtain any judicial relief. At the other end of the spectrum, an act of
self-regulation could bind the agency, and private parties could rely on
it being binding because they would be able to enforce the self-regulatory measure against the agency.31 There is a range of theoretical possibilities here for enforcement, including specific performance and
damages for detrimentally relying on a self-regulatory measure, but
consider the one that maps onto some existing institutional arrangements: a court could invalidate an agency action that failed to follow
the self-regulatory measure.
Whether self-regulation does constrain the agency, then, depends
on whether and, if so, how these self-regulatory measures bind the
agency going forward. In other words, the question whether self-regulation constrains the agency reduces to an interesting question that is
familiar to us from other contexts: can an agency make a credible
commitment to the stability of the position it takes in a self-regulatory
measure?
1. Government and Precommitments
There is a rich theoretical literature across a range of fields about
voluntarily imposed constraints on choices,32 but the literature that is
30 It could be that these acts of self-regulation are not intended to constrain at all. But if
they are not intended to provide any constraint—even within the agency—then creating them in
the first place is something akin to busy work. This Article puts aside that logically possible, but
unlikely, option.
31 The further question of whether self-regulatory measures adopted by an agency could
bind other actors in the executive branch, including the President, and, if so, how they could do
so, is a complication beyond the scope of this Article and will not be examined here.
32 See ELSTER, supra note 3; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Finn E. Kydland & Edward C.
Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473
(1977); Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution
of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803
(1989); Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of
Secure Markets, 149 J. INSTL. & THEORETICAL ECON. 286 (1993); Barry R. Weingast, The Eco-
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most relevant here explores two questions.33 Why would government
(as opposed to individuals or private firms) wish to make credible
commitments about its future behavior? And what are the mechanisms by which government can do so? To understand why these
questions are worthy of attention, consider a commonly invoked example. Because government has a monopoly on the exercise of coercive powers, it has the authority, and sometimes the short-term
incentive, to take private assets for its own purposes, ignoring property and contract rights in the process.34 But without stable property
and contract rights, those with resources will not want to engage in
financial dealings with the government, and they will be leery of engaging in economic exchange more generally if they cannot be assured
that their property and contract rights will be respected.35 A government that seeks to induce investment by private parties and foster economic growth thus has good reason to promise that it will respect
property and contract rights in the future.
That there are good reasons for government to limit its options in
the future does not mean that there are good mechanisms for doing
so. Government may announce today that it will respect contract
rights tomorrow, but as the saying goes, talk is cheap, and next year
when government needs cash it may change its mind and use its coercive power in violation of those earlier promises. So how can government credibly commit today that it will respect private rights
tomorrow? Lawyers think of constitutional constraints (the Takings
Clause36 or the Contracts Clause37) as mechanisms by which governnomic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development,
11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions]; Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983). This literature builds on insights from Thomas C. Schelling, An
Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 282–87 (1956), and R.H. Strotz, Myopia and
Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUDIES 165, 173 (1955).
33 See ELSTER, supra note 3; North & Weingast, supra note 32; Weingast, The Economic
Role of Political Institutions, supra note 32; see also Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the
Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). In a recent work, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have identified the mechanisms by which an executive can credibly signal benign motivations, including the self-binding
mechanism explored here, in order to obtain more authority. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 894–913 (2007).
34 See North & Weingast, supra note 32, at 806; Weingast, The Economic Role of Political
Institutions, supra note 32, at 1–4.
35

See ELSTER, supra note 3, at 147–48.

36

U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.

37

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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ment attempts to make a credible commitment of this sort;38 social
scientists point to particular institutional arrangements like separation
of powers or an independent judiciary (constitutionally protected or
not) that make it difficult for the government to change course in the
future because those arrangements tend to maintain the status quo
and protect whatever policy the government commits to in the first
instance.39
2. Agencies and Precommitment
Translating these insights to the narrow context of the agency, the
most striking fact is that an agency has limited ability to make credible
commitments.40 That is because an agency is (to invoke the embarrassingly obvious) an agent. It is formally controlled by other principals, like Congress, the courts, or the President.41 An agency does not
even fully control its own destiny because those principals can force
the agency to change its commitments. Congress can pass a new statute that displaces an agency’s approach, a court can reject the agency’s
policy as an arbitrary choice or an unreasonable reading of a statute,
or a (new) President can order his (newly installed) subordinate to
change the previous policy choice. This status substantially limits
agencies’ ability to make credible commitments.
Accepting the important reality that agencies are subordinate to
these principals, is there any room for an agency to constrain itself
when it self-regulates? Some strategies that other government actors
might adopt are not available to agencies. As just noted, an agency
38 See John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sanger, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1929, 1929 (2003); Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and
International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 721 (2006); Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism
and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 639–41 (1991).
39 See e.g., North & Weingast, supra note 32, at 804.
40 There is some discussion of agencies and precommitment in the political science literature, but that set of arguments has a very different focus than the questions explored here. The
primary argument is that the creation of and delegation to agencies is a way for a present coalition in Congress to make a credible commitment to a constituency about the stability of policy in
the future. See MURRAY HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 7–24 (1995). The argument that bureaucratic structure and process is a mechanism of political control is to similar effect. See Barry R. Weingast,
Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives, in A NEW HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
167, 178–79 (Robert Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 1996).
41 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246–53 (1987); Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1701–02
(2002) (discussing entrenchment by agencies and the capacity of Congress to authorize or reverse that entrenchment).
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does not even ultimately control the choices delegated to it, and it has
little authority over its formal relationships with other governmental
actors. It thus cannot facilitate credible commitments by rearranging
its institutional relationships with those actors. Consider one example. A design choice that would facilitate credible commitments
would be an arrangement where the agency’s approach could only be
changed if Congress consented to the change. But agencies have no
such authority.
3. The Accardi Principle and Precommitment
Accepting all of this, an agency does have some limited capacity
to make credible commitments.42 There are no doubt a variety of interesting reasons for this, such as an agency’s ability to discern and
rely on stable allocations of political, institutional, or economic
power.43 Here this Article focuses on one formal, legal reason why
agencies can commit to the stability of their policy over time. This is
due to the operation of an administrative law doctrine that goes by
different names but will be called here the Accardi principle.44 The
42 Professor Jonathan Masur has explored an agency’s capacity to make credible commitments through another mechanism than the one identified here. He argues that agencies (previously) had the ability to credibly commit to interpretations of ambiguous statutes when those
interpretations were endorsed by courts, and he laments that the Supreme Court unwisely eliminated this mechanism of precommitment in the Brand X case. Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1037–60 (2007).
43 See REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT (Brian Levy & Pablo Spiller eds.,
1996) (comparative study of regulation of telecommunications industry focused on the relationship between political institutions and regulatory institutions and how effective regulation is at
encouraging private investment).
44 What the principle is called may depend on which administrative law casebook one
learned or teaches from. Here I have chosen to follow Professor Thomas Merrill, who in a
recent work has given the doctrine this name. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 569 (2006). Professor Merrill gives the doctrine this name for what
strikes me as a good reason. It comes from the case that the D.C. Circuit cites most often for the
principle that an agency has an obligation to follow its own rules. United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1954) (holding that where self-regulatory measures vested
authority over discretionary deportation determinations with the Board of Immigration Appeals,
the Attorney General could not limit the Board’s discretion or dictate its decision). Two followon Supreme Court cases were also important in creating the doctrine in the Supreme Court. See
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959) (concluding that the power of the Secretary of the
Interior to discharge an employee was constrained by previously adopted self-regulatory measures); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (holding that the Secretary of State must
conform with self-regulatory measures constraining his ability to terminate an employee).
Others may call this the Arizona Grocery principle, following an early case laying out the doctrine. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932).
For further discussion, see generally Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial
Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965); Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsis-
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complexities of that doctrine will be explored shortly, but consider
now a simple statement of it: an agency has an obligation to follow its
own rules.45 From the perspective of permitting an agency to credibly
commit to future action, the most important feature of that doctrine is
that its enforcement is not up to the agency, but is rather up to the
courts.46 It is true that the courts only enforce the Accardi doctrine if
a proper party comes along and brings a timely challenge to an
agency’s failure to abide by its own rules, but if that occurs, a court
can invalidate agency action that does not comply with existing rules.
And all relevant parties proceed in the shadow of that possibility.
Thus, if an agency chooses to embed its self-regulatory measure in a
rule, it can rely on the fact that a court will require it to adhere to that
rule in the future. This doctrine gives the agency some capacity to
make credible commitments.
The problem of a government agent promising adherence to a
policy in the future is that the government agent (or her successor),
absent some effective enforcement mechanism, can thereafter ignore
the promise.47 Government can say today that it will respect contract
rights, but tomorrow it can exercise its coercive powers in ways that
ignore them. The availability of an effective third party enforcer of
the original promise permits the agent to back it with some level of
credibility and thus induces whatever behavior the original promise
was intended to facilitate.48 And an effective third party enforcer of
self-regulation is what the Accardi doctrine provides. An agency can
say today that it will only bring certain cases and not others, and, if the
doctrine applies, parties can rely on the fact that a court will force the
agency to follow it in the future.
The Accardi doctrine provides third party enforcement of a particular status quo baseline that the agency must follow—namely, the
existing rules that limit the agency’s discretion. It is worth noting that
tency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187 (1997); Peter Raven-Hansen,
Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own “Laws,” 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985); Joshua
I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for an
Agency’s Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653 (1992);
Rodney A. Smolla, The Erosion of the Principle That the Government Must Follow Self-Imposed
Rules, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 472 (1984); Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations,
87 HARV. L. REV. 629 (1974).
45 Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266–67.
46 See id. at 268 (demonstrating the Court’s willingness to enforce agency rules when the
agency acts “contrary to existing valid regulations”).
47 See supra notes 36–39 and sources cited therein.
48 See ELSTER, supra note 3, at 147–48 (describing the lack of credibility of the Chinese
government’s self-regulatory measures in the 1980s due to the absence of a third party enforcer).
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it would be possible for the regime to be otherwise. It could be that
every time a new administration begins its tenure, the prior administration’s self-regulatory measures would not bind the new administration, or at least not be judicially enforceable by the courts. The new
administration would start from scratch, as it were. Such a regime
would have obvious advantages in terms of electoral responsiveness,
but at a cost to stability. Regardless, it is not the regime we have.
It is important not to overstate the significance of an agency’s
capacity to make credible commitments about future behavior. As
already noted, an agency’s subordinate status means that the President, Congress, or a court can override an agency’s self-regulatory
measure.49 Awaking the sleeping giant of Congress is no easy feat, but
ultimately an agency’s self-regulatory measure is not authoritative because one of its principals can reverse it.
Putting this point aside, the agency’s ability to precommit is limited in another way. Although an agency can limit its own discretion
with a self-regulatory measure and rely on the fact that a court will
enforce that measure against it, an agency also has the power to reverse that self-regulatory measure in the future. The Accardi doctrine
does force agencies to follow rules that exist, but the agency can always change those rules. This is unsurprising. It would be odd if a
self-regulatory measure, once adopted, could only be altered by a statutory change and not by the agency adopting a new rule.
Changing a self-regulatory measure is not costless, though. There
are two sorts of costs. There are the straightforward costs of investing
the resources to change the rules, which are not trivial because the
impediments to action are many.50 But there is also another kind of
cost imposed by the existence of judicial review of administrative action. An agency may adopt a new rule, but it must be ready to defend
that rule as reasonable and nonarbitrary to a court. Among other

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (discussing the general costliness of adopting revisions to
existing rules). While Professor McGarity’s piece comments on the mounting costs associated
with the informal rulemaking process, this author could find no research focusing on the cost of
adopting a self-regulatory measure. The cost is likely to vary wildly, but at least some selfregulatory measures will be very costly to review. For example, the budget for the Antitrust
Modernization Commission, an advisory group formed to merely recommend changes to the
antitrust enforcement guidelines, was set by Congress at $4 million. See Antitrust Modernization
Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, at 3, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/pdf/news/faqs.
pdf (last visited May 12, 2009).
49
50
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things, the agency must explain its departure from the prior rules in a
reasonable and nonarbitrary way.51
To those who do not operate within the world of administrative
law, defending a choice as nonarbitrary in court may seem like a trivial obligation. One comparison that leaps to mind is the legislature’s
obligation to explain its statutory choices to courts (in the realm of
social and economic regulation) as nonarbitrary under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. That is, in the usual case, a minimal
obligation.52 But in administrative law, the agency’s obligation to explain its actions is rooted in the APA and is significantly more burdensome than the government’s obligation to explain under rational basis
review.53 An agency must explain in a reasoned way why it acted the
way it did. Those explanations must be supported by the record
before the agency when it made its decision, and those reasons must
be the reasons generated by the agency at the time it made its decision. Post hoc explanations offered by government litigators do not
count.54 The prior rule is not simply the status quo until the agency
invests the resources to change it, but the agency must also be ready to
explain to a court why its departure from that particular status quo is
nonarbitrary.
4. The Precise Scope of the Accardi Principle
Despite these important limitations on agencies’ ability to make
credible commitments about their future actions, the Accardi principle
does provide agencies with some limited capacity to make credible
promises by providing for judicial enforcement of self-regulatory measures.55 But the devil is in the details. Understanding the real reach of
this commitment mechanism depends on understanding the details of
the doctrine.
Although there were important antecedents,56 the Accardi doctrine fully flowered in a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court
51 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); see
also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
52 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–91 (1955).
53 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9.
54 Id. at 50.
55 See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
56 See e.g., Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370,
389–90 (1932); see also Merrill, supra note 44, at 571 n.7 (identifying United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1923), as “the most prominent anticipation” of the
Accardi principle).
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in the 1950s.57 Unfortunately, the clarity stops there. Those who have
most closely studied the evolution of the doctrine since the 1950s have
found confusion in the doctrine about a great many matters. There is
no agreement on the underlying justification for the doctrine,58 what
counts as a “rule” that an agency has an obligation to follow,59 or what
the proper remedy is if the agency has violated that obligation.60 Even
so, certain features of the doctrine can be identified. Some of those
features expand agencies’ capacity to make precommitments while
others limit their capacity.
The first relevant point is that, while an agency has an obligation
to follow its own rules, only certain “rules” are subject to that obligation. The status of the self-regulatory measure matters. Status does
not refer to whether the self-regulatory measure imposes substantive
or procedural limitations on discretion because courts apply the Accardi doctrine to both types of self-regulatory measures.61 Rather, it
refers to the form and effect of the measure. Agencies can issue selfregulatory measures in a variety of forms with a corresponding variety
of legal effects on the agency and third parties. Memos, circulars,
guidebooks, press releases, interpretative rules, policy statements, and
legislative rules can all be mechanisms by which an agency announces
limits on its own discretion.62
In the event that the agency (or an actor within the agency) later
violates one of these self-regulatory measures, a judicial remedy under
the Accardi doctrine is not always available. The D.C. Circuit, which
has decided a large number of Accardi cases, holds that a self-regulatory measure must be followed by the agency only if it is “binding.”63
57 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); see also Vitarelli
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
58 See Merrill, supra note 44, at 569.
59 See Schwartz, supra note 44, at 669–70, 674–78.
60 See Merrill, supra note 44, at 570, 603–12.
61 See Accardi, 347 U.S. 260 (obligating agency to follow procedural self-regulation);
Miami Nation of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring
agency to follow substantive self-regulation).
62 For a description of the wide variety of mechanisms by which an agency can announce
its policy judgments, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1383, 1383–1403 (2004). See also Anthony, supra note 9, at 1312–13; William Funk,
Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2004); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 804 (2001).
63 See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 536–37 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 536–37 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In the
most recent systematic work on the subject, Professor Merrill has argued that this statement best
captures what the doctrine is and should be in the D.C. Circuit. See Merrill, supra note 44, at 592
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There is no self-evident answer to what counts as “binding,” and there
is frustrating ambiguity about which measures a court will deem
“binding.”
There are some reliable guideposts, however. If an agency is attempting to predict whether a self-regulatory measure will be treated
as “binding” and subject to the Accardi principle, one key question is
whether it is a legislative rule.64 In general, if the self-regulation is
embodied in a legislative rule, it will be subject to the Accardi principle.65 (Even if the self-regulation is not subject to the Accardi principle, an agency will be required to explain why it departed from its
limitation, and its explanation may be deemed arbitrary and capricious.66 But this is a lesser obligation imposed on the agency than that
contained in the Accardi principle.67)
There are important exceptions to this general rule that legislative rules are subject to the Accardi principle.68 Most of the ambiguity
here, however, arises in relation to whether self-regulation that does
not appear in a legislative rule is binding. Courts, that is, have applied
the Accardi principle in cases where the self-regulatory measure was
not a legislative rule.69 Thus, while an agency can generally count on a
legislative rule being subject to the Accardi principle, it may be less
easy to predict whether a self-regulatory measure that is issued as, for
instance, a policy statement or interpretative rule will be subject to
that principle.
The effects of these features of the doctrine on an agency’s capacity to bind itself point in different directions. Legislative rules are
generally costly to develop and defend,70 and in that sense the fact
that legislative rules are the only instruments that are predictably sub(“Since the mid-1980s, however, the court has generally grounded the Accardi principle in the
notion that regulations are legally binding.”); id. at 596–603.
64 See, e.g., Singh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2006); Tunik v. Merit
Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 322
(D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Merrill, supra note 44, at 596–603.
65 See SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES § 6.022
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005).
66 Id.
67 See Merrill, supra note 44, at 597–98.
68 See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (requiring agency to follow an internal rule
of agency procedure that was a nonbinding guidance document).
69 See, e.g., Blassingame v. Sec’y of the Navy, 866 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1989); Morris v.
McCaddin, 553 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir.
1969); see also Merrill, supra note 44, at 593 (collecting cases on either side of the legislative/nonlegislative rule line about what counts as “binding” in the D.C. Circuit).
70 See supra note 50 and sources cited therein.
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ject to the Accardi principle limits the agency’s capacity to make
precommitments. On the other hand, the clarity of this part of the
doctrine creates an opportunity for the agency. Whether to adopt a
self-limiting measure as a legislative rule (as opposed to some other
sort of rule) is generally up to the agency, and the clarity of the doctrine means that the agency can opt into court enforcement of the rule
in the future and therefore make its self-limitation more credible in
the first instance. Finally, the ambiguity about which nonlegislative
rules might eventually be subject to the Accardi principle undermines
the agency’s power to use nonlegislative rules to limit itself in a credible way. But the bottom line is that there is a clear, if costly, way for
an agency to adopt self-regulatory measures that will be subject to
judicial enforcement in the future.
The other relevant limitation on the reach of the Accardi principle undercuts an agency’s ability to rely on the fact that a court will
enforce a self-regulatory measure in the future, but perhaps in a way
that does not much matter. Even where the Accardi principle would
otherwise apply, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to
the principle. In American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service,71
decided in 1970, the Court held that the Accardi principle does not
apply to rules that are procedural and enacted only for the orderly
transaction of business.72 Under this exception, the agency is permitted to relax or modify such a rule unless substantial prejudice results.73
In a follow-on case in 1979, the Court held that agencies were bound
to follow their own rules only if the rules affected the rights of individuals.74 As the Black Ball Freight factors have evolved in the lower
courts, an agency is bound to follow its rules that affect the rights of
individuals where substantial prejudice results from the violation of
those rules.75 This exception to the reach of the Accardi principle is
probably not an important limitation on agency precommitment capacity, however. That is because the category of cases in which the
agency’s rules do not have an effect on individuals and no prejudice
results from a breach of the rule are also likely to be cases in which
Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532 (1970).
Id. at 538–39.
73 Id. at 539.
74 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754–55 (1979). The decade of the 1970s was a
confusing one for the Accardi principle, as the Court not only created this important exception,
but it at the same time endorsed the rigid rule of Accardi in both United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), and Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). See Merrill, supra note 44, at 578–84.
75 See Battle v. FAA, 393 F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. CalderonMedina, 591 F.2d 529, 531–32 (9th Cir. 1979).
71
72
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the agency does not have much need to make a credible commitment
to the stability of its rules.
One final dimension of the Accardi principle worth noting is a
feature of the doctrine that expands the agency’s capacity to make
precommitments. By adopting a self-regulatory measure, an agency
can create an opportunity for a party to challenge agency action where
otherwise no such opportunity would exist. Understanding this feature of the doctrine must start with the understanding that, under the
APA, there are certain categories of agency action that will not be
reviewed by the courts because statutes preclude their review or they
are “committed to agency discretion” by law.76 Congress has chosen
to preclude judicial review in a variety of contexts.77 Actions that are
not reviewable because they are “committed to agency discretion by
law” include an agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion78 and allocations of resources across programs from lump sum appropriations.79
Those who follow agency activity are keenly interested in such decisions, but, under the administrative law doctrine, a court will not review the agency’s decision.
If the agency adopts a self-limiting rule, however, a court is likely
to review the agency’s actions to see if the agency complies with its
self-regulatory rule. The Accardi doctrine, in other words, can transform unreviewable action into reviewable action. This appears to be
the pattern in some of the important Supreme Court cases creating
the doctrine,80 and there are many modern cases that follow this principle as well.81 Miami Nation of Indians v. U.S. Department of Interior
See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006).
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8347(c) (2006) (precluding judicial review of Office of Personnel
Management decisions about disability and dependency); 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2006) (precluding
review of certain benefit decisions by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs). See generally Ronald
M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990).
78 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
79 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
80 See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546–47 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (explaining that in the absence of the regulations, the government would
have been free to fire the employee); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388–89 (1957).
81 See, e.g., Miami Nation of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 349 (7th
Cir. 2001) (holding that an agency decision not to recognize an Indian tribe, which in the absence
of agency regulations would have been unreviewable, is reviewable because the Department of
the Interior issued regulations identifying criteria it would consult as it decided whether to recognize applicant); Clifford v. Pena, 77 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that an otherwise nonreviewable Maritime Administration decision to grant a waiver under the Merchant
Marine Act to a domestic carrier to permit it to use foreign-built vessels in operations is reviewable because the agency had identified factors that guided its decisions with respect to such
waiver applications); Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 810 (6th Cir. 1991) (determining
76
77
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provides a nice illustration.82 A group of individuals seeking recognition as a federal Indian tribe challenged the Department of Interior’s
refusal to recognize them. As Judge Posner made clear in his opinion,
in the absence of agency regulations that identified the factors to be
considered in deciding whether to recognize a group of individuals as
an Indian tribe, the agency’s decision would be beyond the ken of the
courts—indeed, he wrote, it would be a classic example of a political
question that the courts would not touch.83 “But this conclusion assumes,” he went on to write, “that the executive branch has not
sought to canalize the discretion of its subordinate officials by means
of regulations that require them to base recognition of Indian tribes
on the kinds of determination, legal or factual, that courts routinely
make.”84 He concluded that the regulations brought “the tribal recognition process within the scope of the Administrative Procedure
Act.”85
that the Army’s decision whether to contract out food services, held unreviewable in other circumstances, is reviewable because OMB-supplied criteria adopted by Army regulations provided legal guidelines for making the determination); Cardoza v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, 768 F.2d 1542 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the failure of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) to review disciplinary action by the Chicago Board of Trade, which
would otherwise not be reviewable, is subject to judicial review because CFTC regulations provide standards by which to assess its action); see Merrill, supra note 44, at 605–06 & nn.155–60.
Professor Merrill, in his recent survey of this body of law, observes that there may be some
retreat from this approach. See Merrill, supra note 44, at 591, 605. Several cases from the D.C.
Circuit indicate this retreat. See Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 66–67 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that an applicable statutory regime provided the exclusive judicial review remedy which could
not be supplemented by Vitarelli claims that the agency failed to follow its own rules); Graham v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (same); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (holding that federal agencies must follow their own rules, even “gratuitous” procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary action, but FAA limitations on discretion here do not
provide law to apply because the regulations give the administrator unfettered discretion to decide not to renew the license of an aircraft inspector); Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 248 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (determining that although the FAA failed to follow internal rules for renewing an
aircraft inspector license, there was no prejudice); Fried v. Hinson, 78 F.3d 688, 690 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (declining to decide whether the court had jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not
to renew a flight examiner designation).
Professor Merrill argues that claims which are unreviewable as a result of statutory preclusion should not be made reviewable through self-regulatory rules, but claims that are unreviewable because they are “committed to agency discretion by law” can be transformed into
reviewable claims by the presence of a self-regulatory rule. Merrill, supra note 44, at 605–06.
Regardless, it is safe to say that an agency can, on some occasions, turn otherwise unreviewable
actions into reviewable actions by adopting a self-limiting rule.
82

Miami Nation of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001).

83

Id. at 347–48.

84

Id. at 348.

85

Id.
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In the end, these features of the Accardi doctrine mean that an
agency has a limited capacity to bind itself in the future by limiting its
discretion today and offering the promise of judicial enforcement of
that measure tomorrow. Its ability to make precommitments is limited because a political principal can reverse the agency (at some
cost), and the agency itself can reverse itself (again at some cost). But
consider a couple of examples of what an agency might be able to do
as a result of the Accardi doctrine. An agency could adopt a legislative rule that sets forth how it will exercise its enforcement discretion.86 In the absence of that rule, the agency’s exercise of
enforcement discretion would not be reviewable by a court.87 But
with the rule, a party would be able to challenge the agency’s failure
to comply with it.
An agency might also adopt various procedural rules that would
entrench policy by making it difficult to change policy or giving certain parties within the agency a veto. It might adopt a rule, for instance, that both the general counsel and the relevant program official
have to consent to policy changes before a rule or enforcement action
is initiated. It might even adopt a rule requiring consensus among all
relevant program officers before any significant action is taken. If
these “procedural” rules, which would no doubt have substantive consequences, were embedded in legislative rules, the agency could credibly commit to the durability of the procedural rules (and their
associated substantive consequences).
II. The Functions of Self-Regulation
With some sense of the key features of self-regulation, especially
how binding a self-regulatory measure can be, we can turn to identifying what an agency can accomplish by adopting such measures. While
there is no literature identifying the functions that self-regulatory
measures in particular can serve within agencies, the literature that
explores the structure of other political institutions, especially Congress, offers insights that can be applied to the particular context of
86 See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing
FDA “action levels,” which advised producers that the agency would not prosecute shipments of
corn having twenty parts per billion or fewer of contaminants such as aflatoxins). For a discussion of the controversy engendered by that case, see Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131
(1992).
87 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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administrative agencies’ decisions to voluntarily limit their own
discretion.
The relevant literature focuses on the problems of collective
choice within institutions.88 Members of Congress have objectives
they wish to accomplish, and they face a series of predictable
problems as they attempt to achieve those objectives within an institutional setting. There is no reason to believe that agencies would be
immune to these problems. It is true that there are important differences between, say, Congress and agencies. Compared to legislatures,
agencies have many more constraints on their options fixed by authoritative sources like statutes. The heterogeneity of interests within an
agency also has a different texture than it does in the legislature. In
the Congress, although members have different specific aims to satisfy
their constituencies, the relevant decisionmakers are shaped by somewhat similar factors—the need for re-election, for one. In contrast,
the picture of incentive structures looks more complex within an
agency. For example, both career personnel and political appointees
are key decisionmakers, though they are not equals.89
These differences between agencies and Congress are no doubt
worthy of further exploration, but it is not necessary to do so in order
to proceed with this Article’s analysis. The particular heterogeneity of
interests within the agency may make the task of collective choice in
some ways more difficult and in some ways less difficult than in the
legislature, but there is no reason to think it is impossible. And, although agency options are fixed in important ways by statutes and
other authoritative sources of constraint, those sources do not crowd
out all agency autonomy. The space where an agency is autonomous
may be large or small, but within that space the agency must decide
how to advance its objectives. The insights of the literature on collective choice within other governmental institutions, in other words, can
be usefully applied to agencies.
Agencies can use self-regulatory measures to advance their policy
goals, whatever those may be. There are a wide variety of plausible
88 For an overview of this theory, see Barry R. Weingast, Rational-Choice Institutionalism,
in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 660 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds.,
2002), and Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 149 (1994).
89 For an overview of the structure of the U.S. administrative state, see B. GUY PETERS,
THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 148–50 (5th ed. 2001) (showing that, compared to other countries, the U.S. public sector is characterized by high levels of decentralization and political
involvement).
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goals.90 The agency may wish to maximize its budget or the interests
of Congress.91 Or it may wish to promote its own version of the public
good—which could mean promoting the interests of “the public” (regulatory beneficiaries),92 neutral expertise,93 or the interest of regulated
parties.94 Any of these goals are possible, but it is not necessary to
settle on the most plausible one in order to see that an agency might
sometimes turn to self-regulation. There are, to be sure, some circumstances in which an agency might best achieve its policy goals by placing no limits on its discretion.
In a variety of situations, however, an agency is likely to see selfregulation as an effective means of advancing its objectives. An
agency can rely on both substantive and procedural self-regulation to
do so. An agency can restrict its options substantively. It might articulate a particular enforcement strategy or approach to licensing. Or,
an agency can adjust the process by which it makes decisions in ways
that will have predictable consequences for policy development. Consider several situations where self-regulation would be in the interest
of the agency.
A. Control of Delegated Authority
Perhaps the most obvious case is where self-regulatory measures
are used to control the exercise of authority that is delegated within
the agency. Just as the legislature delegates some decisions to agen90 See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 2 (1967) (identifying “power, income,
prestige, security, convenience, loyalty, . . . pride in excellent work, and desire to serve the public
interest” as agency policy goals); id. at 79–111 (classifying different types of officials who work in
bureaucracies and describing how they behave); GREGORY HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY: INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 1–6 (2007) (contrasting political and Weberian conceptions of bureaucracy);
id. at 15–24 (identifying a variety of perspectives within political science on bureaucratic power).
91 The budget-maximizing claim is put forward in WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). The latter view is found in McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast’s well-known theory that, through design choices and procedural limitations,
Congress is able to control agencies. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 41. For criticism
of this latter theory, see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 134–55 (2008) (contending that Congress participates in the administrative process in order to promote agency independence, not exercise
control over agency action), and Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance,’ 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987) (arguing that the congressional dominance model overlooks the role of bureaucracies in shaping agency action).
92 See CROLEY, supra note 91, at 142.
93 MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 214–16
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1958).
94 CROLEY, supra note 91, at 14–52; GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Theory of Economic Regulation, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 114, 114 (1975).
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cies95 and delegates within its own institutions,96 so there is a great
deal of delegation within agencies.97 Although the amount of decentralization of decisionmaking varies across agencies, those at the top
of agencies simply cannot make all decisions. Some of this internal
delegation is the result of statutory design,98 and some is the result of
agency decisions.99 In many agencies, frontline and midlevel decisionmakers make hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions each month
that represent the on-the-ground implementation of the laws the
agency administers.100 Administrative law judges determine who is eligible for social security disability benefits, FDA field inspectors determine whether a food product is misbranded or adulterated,
customs and immigration officers make decisions at the border about
the legal status of a product or an individual.
Where there is delegation, as night follows day, there will be
strategies to control the exercise of that delegated authority.101 The
agent does not have the same incentives as the principal and also can
have superior information.102 Thus, the policy makers at the top of the
95 See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 1–13 (1999); D.
RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL
PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 9–12 (1991).

See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVHOUSE 9–14 (1993); KIEWET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 95, at 92–100; J.R.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 1443, 1487–1500 (2003).
97 See DOWNS, supra note 90, at 133–34.
98 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 393(e), 394 (2006) (granting the FDA Commissioner the authority
to establish technical and scientific review committees as needed); 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006)
(providing that the NLRB may delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the
powers which it exercises; the NLRB may also delegate certain powers to regional directors); 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (2006) (authorizing the General Counsel of the NLRB to exercise supervisory
power over all attorneys, officers, and employees in regional offices and to have final authority,
on behalf of the Board, to initiate investigations and issue and prosecute complaints).
99 For example, until 1974, the Attorney General formally signed off on whether antitrust
cases would be brought by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. But in 1974, the
Attorney General announced that he would no longer routinely review the division’s recommendations. SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 4 n.10 (1977). Gregory Huber also describes the internal organization
of OSHA’s enforcement activities. See HUBER, supra note 90, at 51–57.
100 See, e.g., Cynthia B. Dauber, The Ties That Do Not Bind: Nonbinding Arbitration in
Federal Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 165, 165 n.2 (1995) (noting that 391,108
new cases were filed with federal ALJs in 1982–83 alone).
101 DOWNS, supra note 90, at 144–57; HUBER, supra note 90, at 33–36.
102 James E. Alt & Alberto Alesina, Political Economy: An Overview, in A NEW HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 40, 645, 658–59 (Robert E. Goodin & Hans-Dieter
Klingemann eds., 1996); DOWNS, supra note 90, at 134. If the principal that delegated the au96
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agency will attempt to control the substance of the decisions made by
those on the lower rungs of the hierarchy and to assure consistent
application of those decisions across decisionmakers. Self-regulatory
measures are a key mechanism by which top-level agency “principals”
assert this control over agents exercising delegated authority.
Agencies can rely on self-regulatory measures to control the exercise of delegated authority. Most straightforwardly, an agency might
instruct lower-level decisionmakers how to make their decisions.103 In
a more subtle way, self-regulatory measures might structure the decisionmaking process to facilitate desired outcomes.104 A self-regulatory rule might allow field offices to make the decision whether to
bring enforcement actions, or, conversely, it might allow (only) the
central office to make such decisions; likewise, a self-regulatory rule
might empower a large number of officials with sign-off authority
before a major action is undertaken, or it might dictate a more streamlined process.105 Finally, the agency might adopt various monitoring
mechanisms to assure compliance with instructions.106 Effectively
controlling those who exercise delegated authority is a hard problem
for any organization, and there are trade-offs associated with each
mechanism of control.107 That complexity aside, the point for present
purposes is that many self-regulatory measures will be best explained
as efforts by the top-level agency decisionmakers to control authority
delegated to others within the agency.
thority is the legislature, as opposed to the agency head, there will be an additional principalagent relationship between the agency head and the Congress.
103 A variety of examples of such direct delegation is discussed above. See supra notes
97–100 and accompanying text.
104 See HUBER, supra note 90, at 70 (arguing that OSHA structures enforcement of the
statute, which includes choices about decentralization and enforcement strategy, in a “strategically neutral” way in order to advance its aims).
105 A structure or process of this sort can be analogized to McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast’s argument that Congress designs the structure and process of agencies in order to assert
control over them. See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 41, at 248–49; see also supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
106 For example, when and how decisionmakers at the top of the agency review agency
work product will affect the choices made. See WEAVER, supra note 99, at 107–12, for a discussion of Attorney General review authority over antitrust decisions, and HUBER, supra note 90, at
51–57, for a discussion of the internal decisionmaking process at OSHA.
107 See GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIERARCHY 75–177 (1992) (identifying tradeoffs associated with various managerial controls); Thomas
H. Hammond & Paul A. Thomas, The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
155, 156–57 (1989) (discussing the costs of various strategies used to control the actions of
agency officials).
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B. Self-Constraint
Agencies may also use self-regulatory measures to advance policy
goals where there is little need to control delegation. That is, they
may wish to constrain themselves. Consider enforcement strategy in
an agency that makes only a few enforcement decisions a year. One
option for the agency would be to pursue an enforcement strategy informally. As a matter of practice, for instance, the agency may choose
not to bring enforcement actions against certain categories of violators.108 Or, the agency could transform that practice into a self-regulatory rule to advance the same policy objective.109
There are advantages to formalizing the agency policy in a selfregulatory measure. Some of those advantages are internal. The process of actually articulating the practice in writing may clarify the contours of the agency policy. Some ambiguities that do not arise as the
policy is followed as a matter of practice may come to the surface and
be resolved when the agency decisionmakers anticipate the widest
range of possible circumstances. Articulating the policy formally may
also satisfy an internal need of certain bureaucrats by providing them
with an explanation for their decisions. The bureaucrats and bureaucracies described in the tradition that starts with Max Weber—neutral,
impersonal, expert—would prefer to enforce rules written down to an
amorphous set of informal practices.110
Formalizing the policy also provides external benefits. Although
close observers of the agency will have known the earlier practice, a
rule would publicize the policy in a broader way. More importantly,
formalizing the policy evidences more commitment by the agency to
the stability of the policy. If the agency, for instance, chooses to promulgate the self-regulatory measure in a legislative rule, it is opting
into judicial enforcement of the rule against the agency in the future

108 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 13, at 49 (comparing the Federal Communications
Commission’s informal approach to reviewing telecommunications mergers with the Department of Justice’s and Federal Trade Commission’s formalized enforcement guidelines).
109 See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.3d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United
States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673, 675 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982). For a discussion of the
“Thompson Memo” and the “McNulty Memo,” see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
110 See WEBER, supra note 93; Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92
YALE L.J. 1442, 1450 (1983) (“A Weberian bureaucrat is an official governed by a rule that
prohibits him from taking into account individual circumstances.”); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to
Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 146–57 (2003)
(reviewing Weberian conception of bureaucracy).
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and such commitment may induce desired reliance by external
actors.111
It is not all up side, of course. Articulating the policy in writing
requires information, and information is costly to acquire. The transparent nature of self-regulatory rules has a down-side as well. It calls
attention to the policy, which increases the risk of a decisive objection
from political principals or agency stakeholders. Sometimes flying below that radar is better. Nevertheless, sometimes an agency will prefer (public) self-constraint to greater freedom.
C. Entrenching Agency Policy Choice into the Future
At a snapshot in time, then, an agency may choose to formalize
limits on its own discretion for a variety of internal and external reasons. But another reason to adopt self-regulatory measures is to attempt to control policy choice in the future.112 The attempt to
entrench policy into a future administration is familiar from so-called
“midnight” regulations.113
Self-regulatory measures are another way to entrench horizontally across time. An agency might embrace a particular enforcement
strategy and formalize that approach in a legislative rule in order to
impose the highest costs possible if and when a future agency wants to
change the rule. An agency could also entrench policy by adjusting
procedure in such a way that change in the future would be difficult.
A self-regulatory measure might create a process that involves so
many key actors that the status quo bias would be great because it
takes so many to agree to change policies or because the specific actors empowered under the regime will predictably hold particular
views. Whatever strategy is used, the agency’s ability to entrench its
policy choice is facilitated by the Accardi principle, and the strength of
the entrenchment will depend on the cost of undoing the policy in the
future.114
See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 41, at 1666–67, for a definition of entrenchment.
113 See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 953–98
(2003); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the “Midnight”
Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST. L. Rev.
1441, 1442–50 (2005); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical
Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 891–92 (2008).
114 The cost of undoing the policy in the future can be greater than preventing the policy’s
adoption in the first instance. As Dan Carpenter has demonstrated in his study of agency efforts
to achieve autonomy, once an agency gets a policy in place it can be more costly for others to
undo it than it would have been for them to prevent its adoption in the first instance. In Carpenter’s account, agencies create this autonomy by developing reputations for trustworthiness. See
111
112
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D. Protecting Agency Autonomy Today
Agencies may anticipate hostile political principals in the future,
and, as just discussed, they may try to make it difficult for those asyet-unknown principals to change agency policy. But an agency may
also wish to protect its policy choice from interference by today’s political principals. An agency can do so as a result of the same principle
that allows it to entrench policy choice in the future. It can rely on the
Accardi principle—that it must follow its own rules—to its advantage.
If an agency has adopted a rule that sets forth limits on its discretion, a
political principal cannot pressure the agency to act inconsistently
with that rule.115 Imagine an agency rule that dictates that the agency
grant licenses under certain conditions. Even if the President would
like the agency to exercise its discretion in another way, the Accardi
principle requires the agency to follow its rule.116 The same holds true
for political pressure from Congress. Short of a statutory amendment,
there is much that members of Congress can do to pressure an agency
to act as the Members of Congress wish. In the face of threats from
key appropriators to act in a way that is inconsistent with the selfregulatory rule, for instance, an agency must follow its rule.
This protection of autonomy cannot last forever. The President
can order the agency to change the self-regulatory rule, and, if the
agency head resists, find an appointee who will do his bidding. And
Congress can pass a statute overriding the self-regulatory rule. But to
do that, the political principals will have to care deeply about the policy difference and, even if they do, in the meantime, the agency is
(happily) “required” by law to follow its self-regulatory rule—a requirement that a savvy agency can use to its advantage.

DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 1862–1928 (2001); see also HUBER,
supra note 90, at 15–16.
115 There will be exceptions to this. If for some reason there is no possibility that a court
would apply the Accardi principle in a particular context, perhaps because it is settled that judicial review is not available in that context, then the agency would be unable to use self-regulation as a way to protect its autonomy. Self-regulation to protect the agency from political
interference depends on the possibility of a court stepping in to enforce the Accardi principle.
116 Cf. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1954) (holding
that where self-regulatory measures granted discretionary authority over deportation determinations to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General could not interfere with the
Board’s discretion or dictate its decision).
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E. Collective Goods
Although the functions just discussed capture much of why an
agency will self-regulate, they are not the only reasons why it might be
in the agency’s interest to limit its own discretion. The first part of this
section, for instance, discussed self-regulation as a means to control
the exercise of delegated authority within the agency, but not why
agencies might choose to internally delegate in the first instance. But
delegation itself is one example of a strategy that actors within institutions use to advance their goals.117
There is a variety of collective choice problems that agents within
an institution must cooperate to overcome. At a basic level, an institution needs ways of acting that make it run smoothly; it needs to
proceed without chaos. Agencies surely face many such problems of
pure coordination that self-regulatory measures can be used to solve.
The same can be said of externalities. Some units of the agency may
make decisions while other units of the agency (or government) may
capture the benefit or bear the costs of those decisions. Self-regulatory measures could be used to internalize costs and benefits within
the appropriate units.
But the collective choice problem that seems most relevant to
agencies is the need to produce various public goods. Take the important example of information.118 Agencies need to produce information in order to make a wide variety of decisions. They must
determine the safety of a product, assess the cost of a regulatory measure, or uncover the effects of a merger. Such information is costly to
acquire and, once acquired, is shared with all, meaning that without
some intervention that provides incentives to produce information, it
will be underproduced. Self-regulatory measures can be used to establish and delegate to entities that will produce that information and
then invest in becoming experts—working groups, advisory committees, and the like. (Like any delegation, this creates risks discussed
above,119 but that risk will not always outweigh the benefit of
delegating.)
117 The typical problems are coordination, externalities, and public goods. See Shepsle &
Weingast, supra note 88, at 162. For instance, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins argue in LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN, supra note 96, at 83–84, that legislators delegate certain decisions to political parties in order to overcome various collective dilemmas they face. Keith Krehbiel focuses
on the pressing need that legislators have for information and argues that delegation to committees is a way of making certain that such information will be produced and shared widely. See
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 68 (1991).
118 On the legislature’s need for information, see KREHBIEL, supra note 117, at 66–68.
119 See supra notes 102, 107 and accompanying text.
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Another collective good is agency reputation, and self-regulatory
measures can be aimed at developing and maintaining a good reputation for the agency. An effort to control reputation might be a good
explanation for cases in which agencies provide “extra” procedure.
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the U.S. Forest
Service, for instance, have both held hearings and solicited comments
in rulemakings when the relevant statutes would not require it.120
Both the Food and Drug Administration and the EPA have established mechanisms—committees, advisory bodies—that institutionalize reliance on expert bodies like the National Academy of
Sciences.121 These measures are costly for the agency, but they can be
seen as ways to assure the production of the public goods that are
necessary to advance the agency’s goals. Extra procedures and mechanisms to rely on outside experts can be seen as ways to produce information, of course, but they can also be seen as a way of advancing
agency reputation. Extra hearings, an inclusive process, or reliance on
well-regarded experts can all improve the impression others have of
the agency’s ultimate decision and hence, the agency’s reputation.122
III. Implications of Agency Self-Regulation
So far this Article has argued that self-regulation is a distinct phenomenon that, in part due to features of administrative law, an agency
can rely on to achieve a variety of objectives. This Part explores the
implications of self-regulation for some debates that are central to
120 See CROLEY, supra note 91, at 201 (Forest Service holds over two hundred public meetings on roadless initiative); id. at 183–84 (describing FDA’s hearings and solicitation of comment
on tobacco rule); see also Noah, supra note 23, at 137–38 (FDA conduct of notice and comment
for guidance documents).
121 See 21 C.F.R. § 170.20(a) (2008) (FDA’s Food Additive Regulation) (“In reaching a
decision on any petition filed under section 409 of the Act, the Commissioner will give full
consideration to the specific biological properties of the compound and the adequacy of the
methods employed to demonstrate safety for the proposed use, and the Commissioner will be
guided by the principles and procedures for establishing the safety of food additives stated in
current publications of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.”); Notice
of Oxygenate Use in Gasoline Panel Meeting, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,852 (June 14, 1999) (Administrator of EPA created blue-ribbon panel of experts to review issues posed by methyl tertiary
butylether and other oxygenates in gasoline); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE
ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 166–72 (1990) (discussing FDA’s reliance on the National Academy of Sciences in reviewing the efficacy of old drugs). For a general discussion of agency actions of this sort, see JASANOFF, supra; Lars Noah, Scientific “Repulicanism”: Expert Peer Review
and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1047–57 (2000) (discussing use
of experts, advisory bodies, and peer review by a variety of health and safety agencies).
122 Cf. COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 96, at 109–12 (discussing the institutional role of
political parties in maintaining reputation).
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those who study agencies. By showing that understanding agency selfregulation could enrich, alter, or even shape these debates, the ultimate point of this section is to persuade those interested in these
fields to sit up and take notice of this category of agency action.
A. A More Complete Picture of an Agency’s Toolkit
Study of self-regulatory measures could help us understand the
strategies that are available to agencies to achieve their interests
(whatever they may be). Understanding when, why, and how agencies
rely on self-regulatory measures could round out the picture of the
tools that agencies have available to them as they seek to achieve their
objectives.
It is the standard stuff of governance scholarship, old and new, to
analyze how an agency can achieve what it wishes to achieve. Then
Professor (now Judge) Ralph Winter’s well-known studies about judicial review of National Labor Relations Board decisions warned that
the courts’ varying standards of review for law, policy, and fact could
provide an incentive for the agency to shift from interpreting law to
embedding its policy judgments in “carefully contrived” findings of
fact.123 Others have argued that one critical choice that agencies
make—deciding which among a variety of instruments the agency will
use to advance its policy objective—is best understood by considering
the costs and benefits of each instrument from the agency’s perspective, which include the likely judicial reaction, White House oversight,
and the consequences of one choice or another for agency stakeholders.124 The widespread concern, for instance, that agencies are “regulating by guidance” is rooted in an assumption that an agency will
choose one of its options over another in order to achieve its objectives with the least possible cost.125 Professor Stephenson has recently
argued that an agency’s choice between informal and formal ways of
interpreting statutes is a way for the agency to signal otherwise unob123 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the
Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 53, 74–75 (1968).
124 See Magill, supra note 62, at 1443–45. See generally James T. Hamilton & Christopher
H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of
Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111
(1994) (discussing the Environmental Protection Agency’s choice between informal guidance
documents and formalized legislative rules governing hazardous waste).
125 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (criticizing EPA’s use of guidance documents in augmenting regulations); H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 9
(2000).
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servable information to reviewing courts.126 Still other work analyzes
agency behavior in the face of efforts by legislators or the President to
control it.127
All of this scholarship begins with an appreciation of the toolkit
available to the agency and the relevant dimensions of each tool in the
box. Professor Stephenson argues that an agency will pursue formal
or informal methods in relation to the textual plausibility of its statutory interpretation;128 Professor Winter warns that an agency might
switch from law to fact in order to take advantages of standards of
review;129 and many have argued that an agency will wrongly choose
guidance over legislative rules and will get almost all of what it wants
without investing in the public process that makes the exercise of coercive state power acceptable.130 Some of this work seeks to understand and make predictions about agency behavior, and some of it
advances normative arguments about the legitimacy of that agency behavior. But all of it starts with an understanding of the relevant features of the choices available to an agency.
Self-regulation is not now treated as something in the agency’s
tool kit, but it should be. There are several features of self-regulatory
actions that make them distinct from other forms of agency action.
Self-regulation, first, is sometimes the only way for the agency to
achieve some of its objectives. Recall the functions of self-regulation
outlined in Part II. An agency can achieve some of those objectives
through a variety of means. If an agency wishes to entrench policy,
self-regulation is not the only way to do so. An agency can likely entrench policy in the normal course of promulgating legislative rules or
adjudicating cases that implement the relevant statutes. But if the
agency wants to control internal delegation, delegate within the institution, or otherwise create mechanisms to produce needed collective
goods, self-regulation is likely the only way to do so. As the only

126 Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528,
529–31 (2006).
127 M. Elizabeth Magill, The First Word, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 27, 37–53 (2007)
(identifying why and how an agency might not follow presidential wishes and, in light of that,
demonstrating which strategies will work for presidents in certain circumstances). Professor
Carpenter’s account of the development of bureaucratic autonomy also analyzes agency behavior in the face of presidential efforts to control it. CARPENTER, supra note 114, at 361.
128 See Stephenson, supra note 126, at 529–30.
129 See Winter, supra note 123, at 74–75.
130 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1028.
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means to certain ends, self-regulation is distinctive from the other
tools available to the agency.
Self-regulation is distinct in another way. Even where the agency
has multiple mechanisms to advance its objectives, certain kinds of
self-regulation may be a superior choice for the agency because they
will be especially effective at achieving those objectives. Consider an
agency that wants to entrench its own policy preferences, either as
against a future agency or as against present-day political principals.
It is true, as just noted, that an agency can do this by interpreting its
own statute, for instance, in the course of a legislative rulemaking.
But such mechanisms of entrenchment will, as a general rule, be more
transparent to political opponents. If an agency plans to entrench policy by adopting a brand new legislative rule interpreting the agencyadministered statute, that move will be easy for opponents to see and,
if necessary, mobilize opposition.
As an alternative, an agency could use a self-regulatory measure
to rearrange a decisionmaking process in a way that will entrench existing policy. The agency could further decentralize or further centralize decisionmaking authority, it could increase the number of officials
who have to sign off before action is taken, or it could empower an
internal agency unit with predictable views to be in charge of the
agency choice. These options could all work to entrench a particular
policy and they have at least two advantages over a more straightforward attempt to entrench agency choices: the agency has inside information about the effect of such internal process changes, and the
process change is not explicitly substantive. As a consequence, if the
agency advances policy aims in this way, it may be more difficult for
political opponents to oppose the effort or to dislodge it once it is in
place.
B. Effectiveness of Agency Monitors
Study of self-regulation can also tell us something important
about the effectiveness of external controls on agencies. Courts, the
President, and Congress all have a variety of tools available to them to
influence agencies: Congress appropriates money for agencies and is
the primary architect of both substantive and procedural statutes that
dictate agency action; the President participates in the legislative process and also appoints and, under certain conditions, removes the top
leadership of most agencies; and courts determine whether an agency
acts within its legal constraints. As this Article has pointed out, where
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there are no explicit instructions from these principals, as is often the
case, the agency can step in to fill the void by regulating itself.131
Agency self-regulation tells us something about the effectiveness
of these controls on agencies. Consider first the effect of agency selfregulation on efforts by political principals to monitor and control an
agency. The effect is straightforward, and has already been observed.
If an agency self-regulates in the correct way, the agency can blunt the
effect—perhaps only for a time, but perhaps longer—of attempts by
political principals to influence and control its behavior.132 Whether
this is a good thing or a bad thing will depend on one’s normative
views about administrative governance. Some observers of the administrative state prize agency autonomy and what are thought to be
its attendant virtues of expertise and diffusion of power. For those
who embrace that normative view, blunting the effectiveness of political controls would be, in the usual case, a positive good. Such scholars
would seek ways to expand agency capacity to use self-regulation to
avoid political controls. They might suggest, for instance, that the Accardi principle should apply to a broader range of agency “rules” than
it now does, which would expand the agency’s ability to deflect interference by political principals.
For those who prize accountability in administrative governance,
the capacity of an agency to evade political controls in this way would
be problematic. Such scholars would explore strategies that facilitate
political control over agencies, even in the face of self-regulation.
This might include more ex ante instructions from the President in
order to short-circuit agency self-regulatory measures. If the President directed the agency to exercise its enforcement discretion in particular way, for instance, the agency would not be free to develop
alternative enforcement priorities in binding enforcement guidelines.
Directives like that, however, depend on the President having access
to the appropriate information, and information is costly to gather and
deploy. Another alternative would be to advocate for adjustments in
the Accardi doctrine that would weaken the capacity of agencies to
rely on judicial enforcement of self-regulatory measures.
What self-regulation can teach us about the relationship between
agencies and their judicial overseers is just as important, but it is more
complicated. Self-regulation could help scholars assess the strength of
the relationship between judicial review and agency behavior. It is
131

See supra Part I.A.

132

See supra Part II.D.
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almost universally assumed (including, the reader will note, in this Article) by legal scholars who write about agencies that agencies are responsive to judicial controls. To take just a few prominent examples,
judicial review of agency action has been said to have “ossified” the
rulemaking process so that agencies are turning away from rulemaking;133 agencies are said to choose one policy instrument over another
based in part on the standard of review that would apply when the
agency is in court;134 and, in some well-known accounts, judicial examination of agency action has been blamed for agency failure to implement its statutory mandates.135 But there are many determinants of
agency behavior. The prospect of judicial examination of agency action is one of many factors that might influence agency decisions ex
ante. The strong assumption that agencies are responsive to judicial
controls is just that—an assumption; it is rarely subject to testing.
Self-regulation could offer a method for testing the effect of judicial review on agency action. That is because the Accardi doctrine
might serve as a disincentive for agencies to adopt self-regulatory
rules in the first instance. This is so for two reasons. One is because
the Accardi doctrine can transform unreviewable agency action into
reviewable agency action by providing law for the court to apply.136
The other is the straightforward effect of the principle, which is that it
leads to the invalidation of agency action when any actor in the agency
violates the self-regulation.137 These “costs” imposed on the agency
by the Accardi doctrine may undermine the agency’s incentive to selfregulate in the first place.138
One could test whether this is so and thereby examine the connection between judicial review of agency action and agency behavior.
Such study would take advantage of the varying institutional environments in which agencies exist. Some agencies are relatively insulated
from judicial review because Congress has chosen to make a fairly
large slice of their decisions nonreviewable in court. The Department
See McGarity, supra note 50, at 1385–86.
Magill, supra note 62, at 1443–45; see also Stephenson, supra note 126, at 544.
135 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 95
(1990) (discussing a sharp drop in agency rulemaking activity following an adverse judicial decision on one of the agency’s rules).
136 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
137 See supra Part I.C.4.
138 For an argument along these lines, see Krent, supra note 44, at 1189–90 (“Courts insufficiently recognize that permitting third-party review of an agency’s compliance with its own policy may have substantially adverse effects . . . . [A]gencies may respond to such judicial decisions
by rescinding regulations or changing directives to prevent judicial oversight.”).
133
134
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of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) provides an excellent example. The VA,
unlike many other benefit-conferring agencies, has had long stretches
where certain of its benefit determinations were made (largely) without threat of judicial examination of its decisions.139 Other agencies
that distribute benefits, however, are not so insulated from judicial
review by statute.140 Thus, one could assess whether the VA behaves
any differently with respect to self-regulation than agencies that also
distribute benefits but are more subject to judicial examination of
their decisions.
Such an investigation would usefully inform the many and varied
debates about the proper structuring of judicial review of administrative action. If it turns out that the existence of judicial review has little
effect on an agency’s willingness to self-regulate in the first instance,
that would suggest that there is a relatively weak relationship between
judicial review of administrative action and ex ante behavior by agencies. A wide range of scholarly arguments that assume a relationship
between the two would be called into question, and it may prompt a
fundamental rethinking of judicial controls on administration. On the
other hand, if the study demonstrated that the existence of judicial
examination did alter an agency’s behavior, that would be instructive
as well. As a general matter, it would mean that agency behavior
could be importantly shaped by adjusting judicial examination of it.
But the precise nature of the relationship between judicial review and
agency behavior would be more revealing because it could inform efforts to restructure judicial review. Consider one example. If a study
demonstrated that certain kinds of judicial remedies had a stronger
effect on ex ante agency behavior than others, that might suggest how,
given a variety of goals that one might wish to pursue, judicial review
could be structured differently.
C. Informing Normative Views on Delegation
It is a fact about the modern world that Congress passes statutes
that delegate significant policymaking authority to administrative
agencies.141 While statutes have become more prescriptive and de139 Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics of Judicial Structure: Creating the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 155 (1992) (“[U]ntil recently, judicial oversight was
strikingly absent in one important area of agency decision-making—the disability and pension
benefit awards of the Veterans Administration.”).
140 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) (authorizing judicial review of Social Security disability claims).
141 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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tailed over time,142 there is little doubt that today’s agencies have discretion to implement statutes in ways that matter greatly to those who
follow what they do. For some observers of modern government,
these facts are scandalous.143 Critics have a variety of concerns about
delegation. Some sound in a pure commitment to representative government—the “people’s representatives” must make the key policy
choices, period.144 Other criticisms, however, focus on the way that
delegated power is likely to be exercised by the agencies that possess
it. A dominant theme of the modern era, captured in 1969 in Theodore Lowi’s (self-described) “polemical” book, The End of Liberalism, is that delegation facilitates the delivery of rents to
concentrated interests.145
The objection to delegation that is rooted in claims about how an
agency will exercise delegated authority should be informed by an understanding of how agencies actually do exercise power. While there
are many studies of agency policymaking informing these normative
debates about delegation, these studies do not focus on self-regulatory
measures. But they should. The existence of self-regulation teaches
that agencies sometimes voluntarily choose to limit their otherwise
broad discretion.
The mere existence of self-regulation cannot inform debates over
delegation because there are both optimistic and pessimistic stories
about when and why agencies limit their own discretion. An agency
may self-regulate in order to control internal delegations so that those
within the agency do not have opportunities for arbitrary or corrupt
exercises of state power. On the other hand, self-regulation may be
aimed at delivering rents to regulated parties. We do not know which
story is more accurate and under what conditions, and, while the task
is difficult, serious study of self-regulation should allow us to draw at
least some conclusions about which story is more plausible and, if
both are plausible, identify the conditions under which pessimistic or
optimistic stories are more plausible.
142 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 821–45 (1988) (discussing Congress’s move towards
tighter control of the EPA).
143 See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 2.
144 ELY, supra note 2, at 131 (“The point is not that such ‘faceless bureaucrats’ necessarily
do a bad job as our effective legislators. It is rather that they are neither elected nor reelected,
and are controlled only spasmodically by the officials who are.”).
145 LOWI, supra note 2, at 67–126; SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 49–57 (discussing how
Sunkist dominated the Navel Orange Administrative Committee and wielded strong influence
over the laws that governed its industry).
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Understanding the functions self-regulation serves in particular
circumstances and the conditions under which it is undertaken could
alter and shape the debate over the wisdom of delegation. If the study
of self-regulation demonstrates that there are certain conditions under
which agencies use self-regulation to limit their authority in ways that
are appealing, for instance, that could mitigate concerns about delegation in the first instance. More than that, though, such a study would
teach us something about how to restructure agency supervision.
Scholars could then consider how an agency could be encouraged to
self-regulate on the right occasions. If self-regulation is a positive development because it limits the opportunities for corrupt or arbitrary
exercises of state power, for example, then the White House should
use its executive power to require agencies to self-regulate in the situations where it would serve those ends. Scholars could also consider
how judicial review of administrative action could promote agency
self-regulation in those circumstances. Adjustments to the Accardi
doctrine, for example, that reward agencies when they self-regulate in
the proper way and in the proper situations could help push the
agency in the right direction.
D. What Makes an Agency Tick?
For students of bureaucracy, figuring out what makes an agency
tick is a major—perhaps the major—unanswered question. A defining
feature of bureaucracies is that their output is not measured by voluntary exchange in a market.146 The disciplining mechanism of market
transactions provides great insight into how firms behave and the absence of a similarly powerful mechanism for bureaucracies complicates efforts to figure out why they do what they do.147 No public
official, of course, has her outputs measured in the same way that
firms do,148 so the difficulty with bureaucracies is akin to the difficulty
of understanding the incentive structure of public figures. But the
problem with bureaucracies is more extreme. By comparison to those
in bureaucracies, electorally accountable politicians look easy to understand. They at least face one powerful disciplining force: elections.
146 See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 90, at 24–25 (identifying four defining features of a bureau,
including the requirement that “[t]he major portion of its output is not directly or indirectly
evaluated in any markets external to the organization”).
147 See CROLEY, supra note 91, at 19–22 (identifying “three crucial differences between
regulatory decisions and competitive market decisions” which cause the marketplace analogy to
“ultimately break[ ] down” before being of much help).
148 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345–48 (2000).

900

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 77:859

Into this void have come competing descriptions about what
makes agencies behave the way they do.149 In various accounts, bureaucracies seek to maximize one or some of the following: their
budget, neutral expertise, discretion, bureaucratic autonomy, or leisure.150 Or they seek to advance the interests of other actors—rentseeking outside interests or political principals like the President or
Congress.151
Studying when and how agencies engage in self-regulatory measures is one way to help make progress on the very difficult (and yet
important) question of which description of agency incentives is more
plausible. Agency self-regulation is a promising way to assess these
competing accounts because it is voluntarily undertaken—and by that
I mean it is generated by the agency even though no source of authority requires the agency to take an action.152 This cannot be said of
many agency actions and it makes self-regulation an especially revealing window into agency motivation. When an agency takes a significant action, it is often difficult to untangle what part of that action
can be traced to the agency’s motivations and what part can be traced
to the force of authoritative sources that constrain the agency’s action.
But when agencies self-regulate in the absence of such commands,
that allows the observer to see what an agency chooses to do when it is
(relatively speaking) left to its own devices.
1. Public Choice Accounts
To see how the study of self-regulatory measures could shed light
on these difficult questions, consider more closely some of the competing accounts of agency behavior. While a traditional picture of
agency incentives is that agencies seek to advance neutral expertise,153
a prominent modern view, brought to us by public choice accounts of
regulation, is that agencies seek to advance the interests of certain
regulated parties by providing rents to concentrated interests.154 StudSee supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90–91, 93 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 92, 94 and accompanying text.
152 I do not mean to suggest that an act of self-regulation is an unconstrained choice. Even
without an authoritative source requiring the agency to act, there are many powerful pressures,
both internal and external, that will push an agency to adopt such “voluntary” self-regulatory
measures. Even so, it seems to me that the absence of an authoritative source that requires the
agency to act does allow the observer to have a (relatively) clearer opportunity to detect agency
motivations.
153 WEBER, supra note 93, at 214–16.
154 See CROLEY, supra note 91, at 14–25.
149
150
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ying self-regulation could shed some light on whether this public
choice account is plausible and, if so, under what conditions.
Take the example of agency exercise of enforcement discretion.155
It is often the case that that enforcement discretion is vast; there are,
that is, many potential violators of the governing law and an agency
has a great deal of discretion about which violators it will pursue. The
agency’s pattern of enforcement action will matter to regulated parties
because an enforcement action imposes costs on the objects of the
action and also advantages any competitors who are not subject to it.
But an agency can choose—or not—to tame that enforcement discretion by adopting binding—or not—enforcement guidelines that dictate how it will exercise its discretion.
Issuance of binding enforcement guidelines that provide safe
harbors—promises of nonenforcement—to segments of an industry
would be an excellent way for an agency to provide rents to private
parties.156 If the agency chooses to pursue one class of violators instead of others, that places a burden on those who are pursued, and, if
the two classes compete with one another, the agency’s action provides a relative benefit to those who are not pursued. For example, if
the Food and Drug Administration announces a safe harbor for manufacturers of certain over-the-counter medicines, that advantages those
manufacturers in relation to competitors who do risk enforcement
action.
In contrast, it is difficult to see why an agency would promulgate
binding enforcement guidelines that offer safe harbors to certain actors if the agency’s incentives were consistent with a more optimistic
story. To be sure, an agency interested in neutral expertise might wish
to gather information about patterns of violations and use it to deploy
its enforcement resources, and perhaps it is even the case that such an
agency would wish to announce the results of that investigation publicly. But it is hard to understand how the agency would be advancing
neutral expertise by creating binding enforcement guidelines (the
facts may change) or ones that offer safe harbors to certain classes of
violators (there’s no need to tell anyone they are safe from
enforcement).
Thus, if the public choice account is correct, one would expect to
see agencies that are in a position to deliver private benefits issuing
155 See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation,
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 126–31 (2002) (arguing that agency choices
about enforcement are particularly prone to capture by regulated parties).
156 See CROLEY, supra note 91, at 14–25.
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binding enforcement guidelines that offer safe harbors to segments of
industry. Such guidelines would not be consistent with a more optimistic picture of agency incentives. One way to test this public choice
story is to take advantage of the fact that agencies operate in different
institutional environments. Some regulate concentrated interests
within industries and are thus, if the public choice account is true, actually in a position to deliver rents. This is true, for instance, of the
Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to name just a few. By
contrast, other agencies do their business where there are few concentrated interests of the relevant sort, such as benefit conferring agencies like the Social Security Administration or the VA. Thus, one
could evaluate the type of enforcement guidelines issued by these
agencies that operate in different environments and see whether their
output varies in ways that confirm—or not—the prediction that only
the agencies in a position to deliver rents produce the sort of enforcement guidelines that one would expect.
2. Partisan Control
The public choice account does not always play the villain to the
heroic stories of agency motivation. “Politics”—partisan politics—is
another foil. It is taken as a given in some fields that agencies behave
in the way they do in order to serve their Democratic or Republican
principals.157 Traditional accounts in law or public administration
have tended to put more faith in the possibility that agencies advance
neutral expertise.158 Study of self-regulation could provide some insight into the extent of political control of agencies.
If agencies behave the way they do because they are serving their
partisan political masters, one would predict that the stronger that
control, the more the agency would serve that master. Thus, when the
entire government is united under one party, one would expect agencies to behave differently than they would when government is divided and political control is more clouded. Hence, one could
compare agency self-regulation with policy content in order to see if
the content of self-regulatory measures changes depending on
whether government is united or divided.
157 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 41, at 243 (introducing the strategies of
“oversight” and “administrative procedures” employed by political actors to control bureaucratic decisions).
158 See LANDIS, supra note 1, at 23–24.
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This Part has only scratched the surface. It has not fully explored
the implications of self-regulation for various debates about the administrative state. Nor has it even tried to take the next step, namely,
to perform the work that would provide concrete answers to the questions posed here. But this Part did not intend to do either of those
things. The points developed here are instead in the service of the
more modest ambition of convincing the reader that serious study of
self-regulation is worth our time because such study should be able to
inform, alter, or shape these important debates about governance.
How such study will actually do so must await future work. But if the
reader is now persuaded that such work is worth our time, the agenda
here has been satisfied.
Conclusion
In a variety of fields, the intellectual trend of the last several decades can be summed up with two words: “institutions matter.” Attention to institutions has deep roots in the law. To take one example,
legal scholars associated with the legal process school have long asked
a set of questions about comparative institutional competence—questions that are built around sensitivity to institutional difference. The
new focus on institutions in the social sciences asks questions about
institutions that are related to but different from the traditional questions that have occupied legal scholars. Those questions are about
how institutional structures aggregate and filter preferences and how
actors within institutional settings come together (or not) to advance
their aims. Given legal scholars’ long-standing interest in and sensitivity to institutions, it is ironic that this set of questions about institutions is only now starting to penetrate the thinking of those of us in
law who study agencies and their operation. At its most basic level,
this Article is an argument for looking more closely—much more
closely—at the behavior of the institutions that are at the center of
our study.

